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THE INTERPLAY OF STATE
AND FEDERAL LAW
(OR A SMALLER BITE
OF THE BIG APPLE)
Marilyn B. Cane'
I. INTRODUCTION
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)2 "is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction.
It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty
to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent
federal-question jurisdiction."' The parameters and effect of state law under the
FAA are continually being refined by the courts. Since the FAA is silent
regarding the award of punitive damages, the role state law plays with respect to
this issue is unsettled.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION
The availability of punitive damages is hotly debated by participants in the
securities arbitration arena. Many brokerage customers and their counsel contend
that punitive damages must be available in arbitration if arbitration is to be a
forum equivalent to the courts. On the other side, many brokerage firms and
their counsel assert that the purpose of arbitration is to compensate for losses and
not to punish errant brokers. They believe that punishment should be the
province of courts and administrative bodies. Brokerage firms and investors
1. Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law School of Nova University; B.A., Cornell University;
J.D., Boston College. This Article is based, in part, on Chapter 16 of MARILYN B. CANE &
PATRICIA A. SHUB, SECURmES ARBITRATION: LAW AND PROCEDURE 191-204 (1991).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988) [hereinafter FAA].
3. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1982); see
also Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 520 (2d Cir.) (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S.
at25 n.32), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 380 (1991), and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1241 (1992).
1
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continue to argue over whether securities arbitrators have the authority to grant
punitive damages and whether this is governed by state or federal law.
Traditionally, arbitration panels did not award punitive damages.4 Until
fairly recently, it was a common sentiment in the courts that
punitive damages are designed to serve the societal functions of
punishment and deterrence; unlike contract remedies, they are not
designed to vindicate the parties' contractual bargain. Consequently,
absent an express provision in the contract, punitive damages should be
considered as outside the scope of the parties' agreement and beyond
the power of the arbitrator to award. 5
The leading case cited by courts for denying arbitral punitive damage awards
is Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.6 Garrity, a 1976 New York Court of Appeals
case, cited the following three grounds for not allowing punitive damages in
arbitration:
1. Freedom of contract does not embrace the freedom to punish, even
by contract;7
2. Enforcement of punitive damages as a purely private remedy is
against public policy;' and
3. To permit arbitral punitive damage awards is to endorse displacing
the court and the jury, and therefore the state, as the means for
imposing social sanctions.'
However, this customary anti-punitive damage stance has been changing in
the courts and in administrative bodies. For example, the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) has stated that brokerage firm customer agreements cannot be
used to curtail any rights that a party may otherwise have had in a judicial forum,
4. See generally Stephen P. Bedell, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
21 (1987); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.
Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REV. 953 (1986).
5. Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1389 (1lth Cir. 1988) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring). One publication has stated that punitive damages should not be awarded since they are
beyond the scope of commercial arbitration which is a private solution to a business dispute.
American Arbitration Ass'n, Damages in Arbitration, 2 LAW. ARB. LETER, Sept. 1978, at 1, 4.
6. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976); see also Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334,
338 (7th Cir. 1984); Appel v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 628 F. Supp. 153, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Shahmirzadi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 636 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D.D.C. 1985); O'Driscoll
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,822 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1984). See generally Stipanowich, supra note 4.
7. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 797.
8. Id. at 795.
9. Id. at 796.
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including punitive damages.' ° In addition, an emerging common-law trend
forcefully challenges the holding in Garrity." Some courts allow punitive
damages only in very narrow circumstances of gross fraud, indicating reckless
disregard for the rights of others. 2 Other courts have taken the position that to
deny arbitrators all tools available at law will hamstring them and lessen the value
and efficiency of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution forum. 13 These
decisions reflect the view that the federal policy favoring arbitration is best
supported by upholding arbitrators' authority to award any appropriate remedy.14
In several cases, the key determinant of whether to allow punitive damages in
arbitration cases is the choice-of-law provision in the customer agreement.
A. The Continuing Role of State Law: The Volt Decision
The United States Supreme Court dealt with the effect of a choice-of-law
provision in a contract providing for arbitration in Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees. 5
Volt concerned a construction contract containing an arbitration clause. The
contract called for the governing law to be where the project was located, which
was in California.' 6 When a dispute arose, one party to the agreement made a
demand' for arbitration, but the other party filed an action in court seeking
indemnification from two other parties with which it did not have an arbitration
agreement.' 7  The trial court stayed the arbitration pursuant to the California
Civil Procedure Code, and this decision was upheld on review by the state court
of appeals despite the fact that the matter could not have been stayed under the
FAA's procedural rules."'
10. Adoption of Rule Changes to Securities Arbitration Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 26,805,
11989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,414, at 80,113 (May 10, 1989) [hereinafter
Exchange Act Release No. 26,805].
11. See, e.g., Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387; Aldrich v. Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc., 756 F.2d
243, 246 n.3 (2d Cir. 1985); Willis v. Rubiera-Zim, 705 F. Supp. 205, 208 (D.N.J. 1988); Ehrich
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559, 564 (D.S.D. 1987); Duggal Int'l v. Sallmetall, No.
84 Civ. 7170 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1986); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598
F. Supp. 353, 358, 360-61 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); Starkenstein v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 189, 191-92 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Willis v.
Shearson/American Express, 569 F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983). But see Appel, 628 F. Supp.
at 158; Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 543 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
12. See, e.g., Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387; Aldrich, 756 F.2d at 247; Ehrich, 675 F. Supp. at 564;
Willoughby Roofing, 598 F. Supp. at 358, 360-61.
13. See, e.g., Rubiera-Zim, 705 F. Supp. at 208; Willoughby Roofing, 598 F. Supp. at 361-62
(explaining Alabama law); Willis v. Shearson/Anerican Express, 569 F. Supp. at 824.
14. See, e.g., Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 776 F.2d 269, 270 (1 1th
Cir. 1985).
15. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
16. Id. at 470.
17. Id. at 470-71.
18. Id. at 471.
3
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One party argued that the FAA clearly applied to the case, and that, under
the Supremacy Clause, the FAA's procedural rules took precedence over those
of California. 9 However, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
California Court of Appeals in a split decision, holding that, although the FAA
is generally applicable, it does not preempt state procedural rules.' Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that although contracts subject to the
FAA should be resolved with "healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration,"2 this does not mean there is a "federal policy favoring arbitration
under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply meant to
ensure the enforceability, according to the terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate. "22 Despite the fact that the FAA was enacted in 1925 to overcome the
judiciary's long-standing hostility toward arbitration, the key reason for its
passage was to ensure that private parties could enforce arbitration agreements in
accordance with their initial intent.23 Thus, according to the majority in Volt,
parties are free to craft their arbitration agreements as they see fit, including a
choice-of-law provision selecting applicable procedural rules.24
The Volt case held that when "the parties have agreed to abide by the state
rules of arbitration, enforcement according to the terms of the agreement is fully
consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed
where the [FAA] would otherwise permit it to go forward."' Since the parties
chose California law to govern their agreement, they consented to be governed
by California's procedural rules, including the rule which provided for a stay of
arbitration pending resolution of related litigation between a party to the
arbitration agreement and third parties not so bound. 6
The dissent in Volt by Justices Brennan and Marshall conceded that parties
to an arbitration agreement could write an agreement outside the purview of the
FAA altogether.2 7 In such a case, the parties could permit governance by a state
rule, which would otherwise be preempted by the FAA.2" However, according
to Justice Brennan, the question of whether the parties' agreement was outside the
FAA's coverage was governed by federal and not state law.29 While agreeing
with the majority that the federal policy is to ensure enforceability of agreements
to arbitrate according to their terms, the dissent disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that federal policy was not thwarted by the application of the
19. Id. at 474, 476-77.
20. Id. at 479.
21. Id. at 475.
22. Id. at 476. The majority stated that "[tihe FAA contains no express pre-emption, nor does
it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration." Id. at 477.
23. Id. at 478.
24. Id. at 479.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 485 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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California rule. 30 The dissent stated that if customary choice-of-law clauses
were to be construed by state courts as an intent to exclude the application of
federal law, "the result would be to render the [FAA] a virtual nullity." 3
Justice Brennan also noted that since the contract in Volt contained an arbitration
clause, the parties' intention was presumably to arbitrate. 32 Additionally, since
the parties included a choice-of-law clause, they selected which state's law (not
whether state or federal law) would govern their relationship. 3   According to
the dissent, such choice-of-law clauses "simply do not speak to any interaction
between state and federal law." 3' Moreover, in the dissent's view, since the
contract specified "the law of the place," this specification would include federal
law:35 "By settled principles of federal supremacy, the law of any place in the
United States includes federal law. "36
Although it is not clear what effect Volt will ultimately have regarding
choice-of-law provisions and punitive damages, it may be argued that the anti-
punitive-damage stance is substantive and not procedural in nature, and, therefore,
Volt is not controlling. On the other hand, it may be asserted that the thrust of
Volt is that the parties are free to choose governing law in the agreement, and the
FAA's mandate is to enforce the parties' agreement according to its terms.37 In
fact, this second view was embraced by two recent Second Circuit Court of
Appeals cases, Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman38 and Barbier v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton Inc. ,3 which have read Volt broadly. These cases applied New York's
30. Id. at 486-87.
31. Id. at 491.
32. Id. at 480 n.2.
33. Id. at 490-91.
34. Id. at 488.
35. Id. at 490.
36. Id.
37. This is evinced by the majority's statement that not to enforce agreements to arbitrate under
a set of procedural rules other than the FAA would be contrary to "the FAA's primary purpose of
ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.. . . Just as
[parties] may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract
the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted." Id. at 479.
The Supreme Court has also held that the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution does not apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private
parties. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989). Although
the case was not an arbitration case and did not involve securities law, it may be significant because
the Court held that "[i]n a diversity action, or in any other lawsuit where state law provides the basis
of decision, the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the factors
the jury may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law." Id. at 278. It is
possible to read this case with Volt and to conclude that state law will have a far larger role in
determining the propriety of arbitrators assessing punitive damage awards than previously thought.
38. 935 F.2d 512, cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1991. See infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text
for additional discussion of this case.
39. 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991). See generally Brian R. Hajicek, Note, Punitive Damages in
New York Arbitration: Who is Really Being Punished?, 1992 J. DisP. RESOL. 361 (discussing
Barbier). See infra notes 67-96 and accompanying text for additional discussion of this case.
5
Cane: Cane: Punitive Damages in Securites Arbitration:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
anti-punitive damage stance in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) securities
arbitration cases where New York law governed. However, whether other
circuits and the Supreme Court will follow the lead of the Second Circuit remains
unclear.
B. New York's Anti-Punitive Damages Stance
New York law on the issue of punitive damages, as outlined by the Garrity
rules on preclusion, is particularly significant in securities arbitration since many
brokerage firms' customer agreements provide that New York law governs.'
In fact, although the trend for some major brokerage firms is to permit customers
to choose non-industry-sponsored arbitral forums (e.g., the American Arbitration
Association (AAA)) as contrasted with industry-sponsored forums referred to as
self-regulatory organization (SRO) forums (e.g., the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)),
many firms have been intractable with respect to keeping a New York-governing-
law clause in customer agreements. 41  The reason is obvious - a number of
New York cases have upheld Garrity's prohibition on the award of punitive
damages in arbitration where New York law was found to apply.42
Fahnestock and Barbier, two significant cases decided by the Second Circuit
in 1991, applied New York law in denying arbitrators the authority to award
punitive damages in securities arbitration. Both cases cited Volt for the
40. On the other hand, some New York state and federal courts have modified or turned against
the Garrity preclusion. In Aldrich v. Thompson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 756 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.
1985), the Second Circuit held that punitive damages could be assessed in certain circumstances.
There has to be clear and convincing evidence that the brokerage firm acted in a reckless and wanton
fashion in its indifference to tortious conduct of the registered representative, and proof that such
conduct was known to the brokerage firm's management. Id. at 247.
In Duggal International, Inc. v. Sallmetall, No. 84 Civ. 7170 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1986), a New
York court reasoned that the FAA, rather than state law, applies to the question of whether arbitrators
can assess punitive damages since the FAA creates federal substantive law applicable in both state and
federal courts. The Duggal court held that, because it places substantive limits on arbitrability,
Garrity should not be followed and ruled that the sanction of punitive damages in arbitration would
be prohibited only if there exists (1) a federal policy prohibiting an arbitrator's award of punitive
damages or (2) an express or implied contractual limitation on the arbitrator's power to make such an
award. Duggal Int'l, slip op. at 2-4. Therefore, the power of awarding punitive damages is within
an arbitrator's authority. Id. at 6.
41. Failure to introduce the New York governing law provision in contract in the arbitration
proceeding, and failure to object to evidence on the punitive damage issue, may be deemed a waiver
of the right to object to the arbitral award of punitive damages. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Bork, No. 91-0392, 1991 WL 164465, at *34 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1991).
42. See, e.g., Shahmirzadi, 636 F. Supp. at 56; O'Driscoll, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,134; Baselsld, 514 F. Supp. at 543; Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., Inc., 698 P.2d
880, 882 (N.M. 1985). For example, in O'Driscoll, the court deferred to Garrity and ruled that
"[slince arbitrators are not empowered under New York law to award punitive damages, defendants'
motion to strike plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages as to its arbitrable common law claims is
therefore dismissed as moot." O'Driscoll, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
90,134.
[Vol. 1993, No. I
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proposition that an arbitration agreement must be given effect according to its
terms: If the parties chose New York law, arbitrators could not award punitive
damages.
43
1. Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman
In Fahnestock, a brokerage firm, Fahnestock & Co., indicated on an industry
reporting form that a discharged employee, Waltman, was under "internal review
for fraud or wrongful taking of property, or violating investment-related statutes,
regulations, rules or industry standards of conduct."44 Waltman, the employee,
alleged that this constituted defamation and filed an arbitration claim with the
NYSE against the firm. 45  There was no governing choice-of-law clause to be
construed in Fahnestock; the choice of New York governing law was a result of
the diversity of citizenship between the parties rather than any explicit agreement
between them.'
The firm in Fahnestock initially commenced the NYSE arbitration because
it alleged that Waltman refused to return some files after Waltman was terminated
from employment.47 Although the firm initially indicated on the reporting form
(the Form U-5) that Waltman was not under internal review for fraud or unlawful
taking of property, it later amended the form to signify that Waltman was under
such review.48  Waltman filed an answer denying the allegations that he
wrongfully took Fahnestock's property.49 He also filed a counterclaim "in which
he alleged that Fahnestock and three of its officers, the chairman of the board, the
43. See Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122; Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 517. As the Fahnestock decision
noted, "'[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.'" Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 517 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S.
at 477). Accordingly, state law may be applied in arbitration matters, subject to preemption only "to
the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." Id. In Barbier, the court stated:
We need not look to the Fahnestock rationale to determine whether Garrity should be
applied here, because the language of the parties' Agreement is clear: "This agreement
shall ... be governed by the laws of the State of New York." The FAA requires that
private agreements to arbitrate be enforced in accordance with their terms. As we noted
in Fahnestock, the "'parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements
as they see fit.'" Here, the parties elected to abide by "the laws of the State of New
York" in the event of a dispute under the Agreement.
Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122 (citations omitted).
44. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 514.
45. Id. There is a securities industry practice of requiring industry personnel to be bound by the
constitutions and rules of the self-regulatory organizations of which the employing brokerage firm was
a member. These rules require, inter alia, that employment controversies between individual brokers
and their employing firms must be arbitrated. See generally CANE & SHUB, supra note 1, at 232-45.
46. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 517.
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president, and the general counsel, defamed him by filing the amended FormU-5. "5°
The NYSE arbitration panel awarded Waltman $56,000 in compensatory
damages for wrongful discharge, $100,000 for defamation, and $14,700 in legal
fees." In addition, the panel awarded $100,000 in punitive damages although
the parties' arbitration agreement was silent with respect to the arbitrators'
authority to award such relief.52
Waltman subsequently filed a petition in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
to confirm the arbitral award under NYSE Arbitration Rule 628(a).5 3
Fahnestock claimed that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by granting an
award for defamation and by awarding punitive damages,' and he filed a
petition in the Southern District of New York to vacate the arbitral award under
Section 10(d) of the FAA.5 The Pennsylvania district court stayed the petition
to confirm the arbitral award pending the outcome of the action in New York to
vacate it.56 Shortly thereafter, the New York district court denied Fahnestock's
petition to vacate the compensatory damages portion of the arbitral award for
defamation but granted its petition to vacate the award of punitive damages.
5 7
The New York court found that the arbitrators did not exceed their powers in
rendering the compensatory defamation award but held that the arbitrators were
prohibited from awarding punitive damages, following the holding in Garrity.58
Although Fahnstock contended that federal substantive law governs arbitrations
conducted pursuant to the FAA, the court held that "the state substantive law as
set forth in Garrity regarding the inability of arbitrators to award punitive
damages, is not in direct conflict with any express provision of the Federal
Arbitration Act," and therefore, the court held, its application of Garrity would
not violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.59
Falnestock appealed the New York district court judgment confirming the
compensatory damages portion of an arbitration award in favor of Waltman to the
Second Circuit.' Waltman cross-appealed from the same judgment insofar as
it vacated the punitive damages portion of the arbitration award.6 ' The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in full.62
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 514, 518.
53. Id. at 515.
54. Id. Federal jurisdiction was based on the diversity of the parties, as Fahnestock's principal
place of business was New York and Waltman resided in Pennsylvania. • Id.
55. Id.; see 9 U.S.C. § 10(d).




60. Id. at 513.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 514.
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The Second Circuit acknowledged that "there is precedent for Waltman's
position that federal law and policy confers upon FAA arbitrators the right to
award punitive damages even where, as is not the case here, the arbitration parties
agree that New York law is to govern."' The appellate court also agreed that
state law regarding the arbitral award of punitive damages in the absence of an
arbitration agreement on the subject was not preempted by federal substantive
law." After finding that jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of citizenship
and the agreement was silent regarding the issue of punitive damages, the court
held that "'the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in
question . . . [is a] question] of state law.'"' Thus, the Fahnestock court
applied the Garrity rule prohibiting the award of punitive damages by
arbitration."
2. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.
In Barbier, the New York federal district court held that arbitration panels
could award punitive damages and confirmed a NYSE arbitration award which
included $25,000 in punitive damages.67 In their complaint, the Barbiers alleged
claims of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligence
and/or recklessness, and assault against the broker, Bendelac, and his former
employer, Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (Shearson).' The Barbiers contended
that because their account was non-discretionary, Shearson could not trade for the
account without their express authorization.69  They further asserted that
Bendelac and Shearson forged several documents providing Shearson discretionary
authority to trade in commodities and commodities options.7' The Barbiers
ultimately demanded an arbitral award for compensatory, consequential, and
punitive damages. 7  Bendelac and Shearson denied the allegations and
maintained that no Shearson employee had forged the Barbiers' signature on any
documents. 7'
After several days of hearings, the NYSE arbitration panel filed its
unanimous award in favor of the Barbiers. 3 The arbitrators awarded them
63. Id. at 516 (citing Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1386-88; Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752
F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Singer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Fla. 1988);
Duggal Int'l, No. 84 Civ. 7170). The Barbier district court decision which was cited by the
Fahnestock court was later reversed by the Second Circuit. See Barbier, 948 F.2d 117.
64. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518.
65. Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 278).
66. Id.
67. 752 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
68. Id. at 154.
69. Id. at 153.
70. Id.
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$155,645, of which $25,000 represented punitive damages.7' Bendelac filed a
motion to vacate the award in its entirety, arguing that the panel exceeded its
powers or that the panel imperfectly executed its powers by: (1) failing to render
an award on all of the submitted issues; (2) basing its award on a claim that had
been withdrawn; and (3) awarding punitive damages.75 Shearson challenged
only that portion of the award granting punitive damages.76 However, the
district court granted the Barbiers' petition to confirm the arbitral award and
denied Bendelac's and Shearson's motions to vacate the award.'
According to the lower court in Barbier, the threshold issue was whether
federal or New York arbitration law controlled the arbitration agreement.7"
Although Shearson argued that the inclusion of a New York choice-of-law clause
in the customer agreement mandated that New York law controlled, the court
disagreed and found that since the underlying transactions were of an interstate
nature, the FAA clearly applied to the arbitration provision at issue.79 The court
stated that it is "well-settled in this circuit that federal arbitration law applies to
contracts embraced by the Act despite [the inclusion of] a contractual New York
choice-of-law provision."'
The New York federal district court noted, however, that the application of
federal law had been "undercut" by the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Volt."1 Nonetheless, the district court concluded that Volt did not stand for
the proposition that any time a choice-of-law provision is included in an
arbitration agreement, such a provision necessarily requires the application of
state rather than federal arbitration law.' According to the Barbier district




77. Id. at 164.
78. See id. at 154. The Agreement, in paragraph 13, contained an arbitration provision which
stated, in pertinent part:
This agreement shall . . . be governed by the laws of the State of New York. Unless
unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to
[the Barbiers'] accounts, to transactions with [Shearson, its] officers, directors, agents
and/or employees for [the Barbiers] or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. as [the Barbiers] may elect .... Judgment upon any award rendered by
the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
Id. at 153.
79. Id. at 155.
80. Id. (citations omitted). Other circuits have held likewise. See, e.g., New England Energy,
Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077
(1989*); Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238,243-44 (5th
Cir. 1986); see also Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089 (3d Cir. 1987).
81. Barbier, 752 F. Supp. at 155.
82. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
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court, Volt stood for the proposition that the parties' intention should govern and
should be carried out by a court enforcing the arbitration agreement.'
In Barbier, the district court found the language of the agreement at issue to
be ambiguous and, after interpreting the same, concluded that, unlike the situation
in Volt, the parties did not agree that arbitration proceedings under their
agreement were to be governed by state arbitration law.' Accordingly, it held
that federal substantive law governed and empowered the arbitration panel to
award punitive damages.'
Bendelac appealed the district court decision to the Second Circuit,
contending that the district court erred by denying his motion to vacate the arbitral
award in its entirety.' As grounds for vacatur, Bendelac asserted that the
arbitration award was based partly on issues that were withdrawn from arbitral
consideration and that the arbitration panel failed to consider all issues presented
to it.' He also argued that the court incorrectly applied Section 10(d) of the
FAA, rather than New York's arbitration statute." Bendelac alleged that the
FAA did not apply because jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of citizenship,
where the Erie doctrine required the court to apply New York's arbitration
statute.8 9 He further argued that because the court was required to apply settled
New York law which prohibited the arbitrators from awarding punitive damages
under Garrity, it was error to confirm the panel's punitive damage award.'
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment confirming the
compensatory damages arbitral award and reversed the portion of the judgment
confirming the arbitral award of punitive damages.9' The appellate court applied
Garrity to preclude the award of punitive damages.' However, the court
reversed the award of punitive damages based not upon the Erie doctrine but
because Volt required the court to enforce the parties' agreement according to its
terms and the agreement affirmatively chose New York law to govern.
93
83. Id. at 155-56 (footnote omitted).
84. See id. at 156. "The clause admits of two possible readings, neither of which is patently
unreasonable: the choice-of-law clause might on the one hand be read to require only the application
by the arbitrators of New York substantive law to disputes between the parties, or on the other to
mandate that New York substantive law, as well as New York arbitration law, apply to the arbitration
proceeding." Id. (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 157. The Barbier court also noted that application of the Garrity rule in that although
the parties had agreed to arbitrate claims, including punitive damage claims, a state-made rle
declaring punitive damages non-arbitrable would result in these claims going to court rather than
arbitration. See id. at 160 & n. 15. This would result in a paradox that would both frustrate the intent
of the parties and thwart the mandate of the FAA. See id. n.15.
86. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 118 (2d Cir. 1991).
87. Ad.
88. Id.; see N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 7501-7511 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1991).
89. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 118.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 121.
93. Id. at 122.
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The Second Circuit stated that it did not need to look to the Fahnestock
rationale to determine whether Garrity applied because the language of the
parties' agreement in Barbier clearly stated: "This agreement shall . . . be
governed by the laws of the State of New York. "' The appellate court stated
that the FAA requires private arbitration agreements to be enforced in accordance
with their terms' and remarked that:
"Where . . . the parties have agreed to abide by [New York law],
enforcing [that law] according to the terms of the agreement is fully
consistent with the goals of the FAA," even if the result is that punitive
damages are prohibited where in the absence of the choice-of-law
provision, they would be permitted.'
3. American Arbitration Association (AAA) v. NYSE Provisions
Regarding Punitive Damages: Court Interpretation
In Fahnestock, the Second Circuit left open the possibility that arbitrators
could award punitive damages even where New York law applies, provided "that
an agreement between the parties specifically [authorized the arbitrators] to award
punitive damages. "I As the court noted:
The Garrity rule, to the extent that it purports to prevent arbitrators
from awarding punitive damages in the face of such an agreement,
seems to invoke preemption concerns, since it runs afoul of the federal
substantive law rules that sweep aside any state attempt to interfere with
the agreement of the parties. The matter may be left for another day,
however, because we deal here only with the NYSE provisions for
arbitration."
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 478-79).
96. Id. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479) (alterations in original).
97. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518.
98. Id. The court noted that:
Article XI of the NYSE Constitution provides that "[alny controversy between .. a
member, allied member or member organization and any other person, arising out of the
business of such member ... shall at the instance of any such party, be submitted for
arbitration .... ." 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 1501. ... NYSE rle 600(a) provides
for the arbitration of "[a]ny dispute, claim or controversy," 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2600, and NYSE rule 347 provides for the arbitration of "any controversy ... arising
out of the employment or termination of employment. . . " 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2347. Despite this broad language, the NYSE provisions are silent with regard to the
power of arbitrators to award punitive damages.
Id. at 518-19.
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The NYSE rules, at issue in both Barbier and Fahnestock, are silent as to
punitive damages; indeed the NYSE rules have no provisions relating to remedy
or relief.99 From this silence the Second Circuit concluded that "[c]learly, if the
NYSE wanted to empower arbitrators to award punitive damages, it could have
done so."" ° The court noted that, contrary to the NYSE rules, the AAA rules
provide that arbitrators may award "any remedy or relief which [is] just and
equitable and within the scope of the agreement" which may have led to a
different result had the AAA been the arbitral forum.''
In addition, although the NYSE award form, used by NYSE arbitrators to
memorialize the arbitral awards, allows for entry of a punitive damages award
under a specific heading marked "punitive damages," the Fahnestock court was
not persuaded that this meant that the NYSE arbitrators had the authority to award
punitive damages in the case under review because the award forms were not part
of the arbitration agreement." It then stated "[m]oreover, NYSE arbitrations
occur throughout the nation, and our holding here does not mean that in those
states in which arbitral punitive damages awards are permitted, arbitrators may
not appropriately utilize the punitive damages section of the award form. ""0
A recent Ninth Circuit case, Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line,
Ltd., 1o concerned, inter alia, punitive damages in an AAA maritime arbitration
involving a contract governed by New York law. 1" The arbitration panel
awarded $1 million to Todd Shipyards "as a consequence of Cunard's bad faith,
deceptive practices, knowingly making incorrect representations to Todd
Shipyards during contract performance and improper withholding of monies
due. ""(3 Cunard asserted that the district court erred in confirming that part of
the award because it was beyond the power of the arbitrators to make a punitive
damage award since under New York law (as expressed by Garrity), commercial
arbitrators do not have the authority to award punitive damages. 07 Cunard
relied on Volt, but the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded and stated:
Cunard argues that Volt dictates the view that when a state choice of
law provision is part of a contract, state arbitration rules should be
followed, and, because New York law prohibits punitive damage
awards in arbitrations, the award in this case should be vacated.
Cunard's reliance on Volt is inapposite. The Supreme Court did not
say a state choice of law provision that does not expressly encompass





104. 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).
105. Id. at 1058.
106. Id. at 1063.
107. Id. at 1062.
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state arbitrition rules, does so by operation of law. The Court merely
said that it would not disturb a state court's factual determination that
the parties to the contract in Volt intended to invoke California
arbitration rules. 11
The Todd Shipyards case involved the application of the AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules, and the Ninth Circuit upheld the punitive damage award. The
Todd Shipyards court noted, however, that "New York substantive law applies to
the question whether, although the panel had the power to award punitive
damages, the award was legally appropriate given the facts of this case ....
Under New York law, punitive damages for fraud are available 'upon a showing
of willful and wanton conduct.'"
The Todd Shipyards court distinguished the result in Fahnestock because
Fahnestock was decided under the rules of the NYSE and because the Fahnestock
court acknowledged that cases under the AAA rules might provide for the arbitral
award of punitive damages because of the AAA's expansive remedies rule."0
The Commercial Rules of the AAA include Rule 43, which reads as follows:
"Scope of Award: The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which the
Arbitrator deems just and equitable within the scope of the agreement of the
parties.""' The Securities Arbitration Rules (SAR) of the AAA include Rule
43: "The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just
and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but
not limited to, specific performance of a contract."12 Thus, whether the
AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules or the SAR Rules are chosen, the
arbitrators are seemingly vested with ample powers to design suitable remedies.
It is not certain, however, that even the AAA's liberal remedies provisions
will convince every court that arbitral punitive damages are permissible. In Judge
Tjoflat's special concurrence in Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,"3 he
noted that, although in the appropriate case the award of punitive damages may
be "just and equitable," such award could not be deemed to have been "within the
scope of the parties'" agreement absent some express agreement," 4 According
to Judge Tjoflat:
Punitive damages are designed to serve the societal functions of
punishment and deterrence; unlike contract remedies, they are not
designed to vindicate the parties' contractual bargain. Consequently,
108. Id. (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 477).





113. 835 F.2d 1378.
114. Id. at 1388 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
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absent an express provision in the contract, punitive damages should be
considered as outside the scope of the parties' agreement and beyond
the power of the arbitrator to award."I
A 1989 First Circuit case, Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems,
Inc. ,116 held that punitive damages were available in AAA commercial
arbitration." 7 The court distinguished labor arbitration, where punitive damages
are not generally available, from commercial arbitration. " Whereas the award
of punitive damages in labor arbitration might undermine the ongoing relationship
of unions and management, such continuing relationship is not generally present
in commercial arbitration." 9 As the court noted, commercial arbitration is a
one-shot endeavor and not a means of ongoing dispute resolution. " Therefore,
a punitive damage award is appropriate in commercial arbitration since
the fact that the parties agreed to resolve their dispute through an
expedited and less formal procedure does not mean that they should be
required to surrender a legitimate claim to damages. Parties that do
wish arbitration provisions to exclude punitive damages claims are free
to draft agreements that do so explicitly. ''
The Raytheon rationale is also applicable to securities arbitration. Securities
arbitration is a one-shot endeavor designed to address a specific grievance; the
parties almost never maintain a relationship after a dispute. In addition, the
impetus for permitting punitive damage awards is even greater in customer-broker
securities arbitration than in commercial arbitration, as the relative bargaining
position of the parties, compared with that of two business entities, is usually
disproportionate. However, the suggestion in Raytheon that the parties to an
arbitration agreement may exclude punitive damages should not be available in the
SRO broker-customer context."22 Indeed, the SEC Release approving the rules
changes in SRO arbitration states:
[a]greements cannot be used to curtail any rights that a party may
otherwise have had in a judicial forum. If punitive damages or
attorneys fees would be available under applicable law, then the
115. Id. at 1388-89.
116. 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Douglas R. Davis, Note, Overextension of Arbitral
Authority: Punitive Damages and Issues of Arbitrability - Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business
Systems, Inc., 65 WAsH. L. REv. 695 (1990) (recommending that arbitrators interpret broadly-drafted
arbitration clauses to encompass only traditional contract remedies).
117. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 12.
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agreement cannot limit the parties' rights to request them, nor
arbitrators' right to award them."m
4. Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
In 1988, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Bonar v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. " and addressed the effect of a New York choice-of-law
provision in a brokerage firm's customer agreement, affirming that punitive
damages may be awarded by AAA arbitrators. 1" The court held that a choice-
of-law provision in a contract under the FAA only designates the substantive law
the arbitrators must apply to determine whether the conduct of the parties
warrants an award of punitive damages; it does not affect whether the arbitrators
can award punitive damages if the rules of the arbitration forum permit such
awards.' 26 In Bonar, the court stated that Garrity had no application to cases
arising under the FAA because
Garrity dealt only with the powers of arbitrators under state law and
state public policy, and has no application in cases arising under the
[FAA].... Thus, a choice of law provision in a contract governed by
the [FAA] merely designates the substantive law that the arbitrators
must apply in determining whether the conduct of the parties warrants
an award of punitive damages; it does not deprive the arbitrators of
their authority to award punitive damages .
Since Bonar preceded Volt, the possible impact of Volt on Bonar has not
been squarely addressed by the courts. However, in Fahnestock, the Second
123. Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 10, at 80,113.
124. 835 F.2d 1378.
125. Id. at 1388.
126. Id. at 1387. The effect of choice-of-law provisions in a contract providing for arbitration
was at issue in Volt, 489 U.S. 468. Volt, a contractual dispute, did not involve securities arbitration,
though it involved interstate commerce, and the parties provided that California law was to apply.
Id. at 470. The pertinent California statute, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 1978),
permits a stay of arbitration pending the resolution of related litigation with third parties not bound
to arbitrate, whereas the FAA would require the arbitration to go forward. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 472.
The Supreme Court held that the FAA, although applicable, did not preempt state procedural rules.
Id. at 478. As the Court stated:
There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the
federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private
agreements to arbitrate. Interpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable state rules
governing the conduct of arbitration - rules which are manifestly designed to encourage
resort to the arbitral process - simply does not offend the rule of liberal construction set
forth in Moses Cone, nor does it offend any other policy embodied in the FAA.
Id. at 476. The Volt decision has been criticized by Robert Coulson, President of the AAA. See AAA
President Says Volt Decision Creates a Setback for Arbitration, 3 Alternative Disp. Resol. Rep.
(BNA) 135 (April 13, 1989).
127. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1386-87.
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Circuit noted that Bonar involved an arbitration under that AAA rules and that the
AAA rules, unlike the NYSE rules, potentially allowed punitive damage
awards. 28  This may portend the resumption of the long-fought battle of the
arbitration forums. For if Fahnestock and Barbier are limited to mean that the
Garrity prohibition applies to the NYSE, but not the AAA, arbitrations' customers
will fight to have the AAA as their forum.'29
C. Punitive Damages Should Be Available in Securities Arbitration
Given the results in Fahnestock and Barbier, it is unlikely that brokerage
firms will allow customers to choose governing law other than New York. Since
the touchstone of Volt is to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate,
like other contracts, in accordance with their terms, it follows that courts must
scrutinize the parties' intent. Judge Mahoney, dissenting from the holding on
punitive damages in the Second Circuit majority opinion in Fahnestock, criticized
the lower court in that case because "no significant inquiry was conducted
regarding the intent of the parties, and no mention was made of the NYSE award
form, applicable here, that makes specific provision for punitive damages.
Rather, Garrity was deemed controlling as a matter of law.""3° As Judge
Mahoney thoughtfully noted,
[t]he majority's approach effectively disregards the existence of a "body
of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor
an agreement to arbitrate," and imposes the diversity regime of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins. The Erie standard is intended, however, for "all
matters except those in which some federal law is controlling." It
therefore seems to me clearly inappropriate to apply Erie-generated
rules to an area for which, the Supreme Court has instructed, federal
law supplies the rule of decision. That, however, is precisely what the
majority has done in this case. 3'
Judge Mahoney cited numerous cases permitting arbitrators to award punitive
damages by looking to the agreement of the parties,'32 and, in particular, cited
cases similar to Bonar, wherein punitive damages were allowed even when the
128. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 519.
129. See CANE & SHUB, supra note 1, at 48-54 (discussing the "AMEX Window").
130. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 520 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32) (citation omitted).
132. Id. at 521 (citing Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 9-12; Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1386-88; Pyle v.
Securities U.S.A., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 638, 639 (D. Colo. 1991); Barbier, 752 F. Supp. at 159-60;
Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Ehrich, 675 F. Supp. at
563; Duggal Int'l, No. 84 Civ. 7170; Willoughby Roofing, 598 F. Supp. at 357-59; Willis v.
Shearson/American Express, 569 F. Supp. at 823).
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pertinent contract explicitly stated that it was to be governed by New York law,
notwithstanding Garrity. 133
The United States Supreme Court, in Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon," also buttressed arbitration panels' authority to make punitive
damage awards. Shearson has by implication endorsed substituting arbitration
panels as the mechanism for imposing sanctions since "it would be hard to
imagine that if the Supreme Court empowers an arbitration panel to award treble
damages in RICO cases it would preclude punitive damages in appropriate
cases."135  Moreover, in Perry v. Thomas,'3 decided one week after
McMahon, the Court ruled that Section 2 of the FAA created a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability that would govern and be enforceable in state and
federal courts even if there was state substantive or procedural policy to the
contrary.' 37 This seemingly meant that state court cases precluding punitive
damage awards would be preempted by the FAA's broad grant of powers to
arbitration panels.
The thrust of the United States Supreme Court cases in the securities
arbitration area, particularly Shearson/American Express v. McMahon 38 and
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,'39 is that the policy of the
securities laws is not undermined by permitting arbitration of securities disputes.
Judicial hostility toward arbitration has been abated in large part because the
Court has found arbitration to be an acceptable forum to protect the rights created
under the securities laws and common law. In Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court
stated that, to the extent older cases "rested on suspicion of arbitration as a
method of weakening the protection afforded in substantive law to would-be
complainants, it has fallen out of step with our current strong endorsement of the
federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes. ""o To conclude that
a person has the right to punitive damages in a court setting, but not in an arbitral
setting, would undermine the concept that arbitration is an appropriate alternative
forum.
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) position is that arbitration
agreements between brokerage firms and customers may not be used to curtail the
133. Id. (citing Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11; Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1386-87; Barbier, 752 F. Supp.
at 153, 160 & n. 15; Singer, 699 F. Supp. at 278-79; Ehrich, 675 F. Supp. at 565; Duggal nt'l, No.
84 Civ. 7170; Willoughby Roofing, 598 F. Supp. at 359; Willis v. Shearson/American Express, 569
F. Supp. at 823-24).
134. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
135. DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION 125 (1988). A New York state court has
held that New York's public policy prohibiting an arbitrator from awarding punitive damages does not
preempt the federal rle that RICO treble damage claims are arbitrable. See Helmsley Enters. v.
Lepercq, Deneuflize & Co., 562 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (App. Div. 1990).
136. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
137. Id. at 489-91.
138. 482 U.S. 220.
139. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
140. Id. at 481.
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availability of punitive damages.1 4 1 This position should not be undermined
indirectly through a choice-of-law provision any more than through a direct
prohibition in the agreement. Ironically, in cases governed by New York law,
punitive damages have been precluded under the NYSE rules despite the fact that
the SEC has oversight jurisdiction over the NYSE, a self-regulatory organization,
but punitive damages have not been precluded under the rules of the AAA, an
independent organization.
It is implausible that brokerage customers realize that by signing a customer
agreement with a New York governing choice-of-law clause they may have
abandoned any claim they may have to punitive damages. Moreover, it is
preposterous to assume that the typical investor will understand the nuances of
choosing the AAA or NYSE forums with respect to the punitive damage issue.
I can only echo what Judge Mahoney stated in his dissent in Fahnestock that "the
imposition of the Garrity rule, without respect to [or any meaningful inquiry
regarding] the contractual intention of the parties, directly contravenes the
dominant purpose and policy of the FAA as repeatedly articulated by the Supreme
Court. "142
At the behest of the SEC, the SROs now require brokerage agreements with
arbitration clauses to include highlighted language informing customers that they
are "waiving their right to seek remedies in court.""4 However, the SEC,
through its SRO rule-making oversight, does not presently require brokerage-firm
agreements with customers to explain that this could mean that customers signing
such agreements may be relinquishing their rights to obtain punitive damages in
arbitration. In such cases, customers' consent to arbitration may not be truly
informed.
Regardless of the forum selected, punitive damages should be available only
where there has been particularly egregious conduct, as New York courts have
held. In 1989, the New York Court of Appeals specified that punitive damages
were not recoverable unless "the wrong complained of is morally culpable, or is
actuated by evil and reprehensible motives."'" Additionally, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York has dismissed punitive
damage claims in securities fraud cases that fall short of the New York
standard. 145
Apart from whether Garrity prohibits arbitrators from assessing punitive
damages, there is the issue of whether garden variety securities law fraud claims
would support a claim for punitive damages in court. Some courts refuse to
permit arbitrators to award punitive damages specifically in cases where the cause
141. See Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 10, at 80,113.
142. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 521 (Mahoney, I., dissenting).
143. See Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 10, at 80,113.
144. Franks v. Cavanaugh, 711 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Walker v.
Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. 1961)); see also Borkowski v. Borkowski, 355 N.E.2d 287
(N.Y. 1976) (per curiam)).
145. Franks, 711 F.Supp. at 1192 (citing Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 509 F. Supp. 68, 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
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of action arises under express liability provisions of the federal securities acts"4
or where the cause of action is implied from those provisions. Courts denying
punitive damages under the federal securities acts generally do so as a matter of
statutory construction and federal policy, both of which involve an analysis of
congressional intent. Section 28(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(the 1934 Act), which limits recovery in private actions to "actual damages,"
withholds punitive damages from claimants alleging a violation of express or
implied provisions.47
In Green v. Wolf Corp., the Second Circuit rejected the contention that
punitive damages were available for an implied cause of action under Rule lOb-5
of the 1934 Act. 49 Similarly, in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.,"s the
same court prohibited punitive damage awards under a cause of action implied
from section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933.'51 In Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch
& Co., the court dismissed claims for punitive damages in an arbitration
setting because the underlying causes of action under the federal securities law did
not support punitive awards in a litigation setting. 153
This limitation may be more apparent than real, however. The United States
Supreme Court has not directly faced the question of whether the federal policy
denying punitive damages awards under the federal securities laws would apply
to pendent state claims joined in an arbitral forum. Although Globus reserved the
question of whether section 28(a) of the 1934 Act prohibits punitive damages in
a pendent common law fraud claim joined to an action based on the 1934 Act, the
Second Circuit held that punitive damages were recoverable in common law fraud
claims." Moreover, the numerous cases upholding punitive damage awards
in securities arbitration demonstrate that claimants may successfully allege pendent
state law and common law claims which do not prohibit the imposition of punitive
damages along with allegations of violations of the federal securities laws.
However, even assuming that punitive damages were allowable and awarded,
there are further unresolved issues. For example, Florida statute section
768.73155 provides that "[in]n any civil action" 60 percent of punitive damages
146. See generally Thomas J. Kenny, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The
Unresolved Question Of Pendent State Claims, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 1113 (Summer 1988).
147. See generally id.
148. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
149. Id. at 303; see also Flaks v. Kogel, 504 F.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1974).
150. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
151. Id. at 1283-85; see also In re Energy Sys. Equip. Leasing Sec. Litig., 642 F. Supp. 718,
744 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (deciding that punitive damages were not available under either the 1933 or
1934 Acts).
152. 692 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
153. Id. at 226; see also Stacy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 88 C 9163,
1989 WL 20777 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
154. Flaks, 504 F.2d at 707.
155. FLA. STAT. cH. 768.73 (1992).
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awarded are payable to the state.5 6 In Miele v. Prudential Bache Securities,
Inc.,'57 the Eleventh Circuit has recently certified to the Florida Supreme Court
the question of whether the statute applies to punitive damages awarded in
arbitration.18 Obviously, this has great practical import where Florida law is
deemed to apply.
III. CONCLUSION
The reluctance of the brokerage industry to allow lay arbitrators to award
punitive damages, particularly given the limited right of appeal from arbitral
awards, is understandable. However, if New York choice-of-law provisions
become standard and non-negotiable, the industry may be faced with oft-
threatened Congressional action to limit SRO arbitration in the broker-customer
context or court cases invalidating such clauses. Section 2 of the FAA provides
that a written provision to arbitrate is enforceable, "save upon such grounds as
exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ""5" The Supreme
Court has stated that, "courts should remain attuned to well supported claims that
the agreement resulted from . . .overwhelming economic power that would
provide the grounds 'for the revocation of any contract.'"" Indeed, the
Supreme Court left open the possibility of challenging customer agreements on
the basis that the contract was adhesive in nature. 161 To date, contractual
defenses to the enforcement of arbitration clauses in customer agreements,
including allegations that such clauses should not be enforced because they are
contracts of adhesion or are unconscionable, have met with extremely limited
success."S However, the door is not absolutely closed to such arguments. The
securities industry may win the battle, but lose the war.
By attempting to limit arbitrators' authority to award punitive damages where
they may be appropriate, through choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions
in standard contracts, the industry undercuts the fundamental fairness of securities
arbitration. Securities arbitration must not only be objectively fair, but it must
be perceived by the investing public as an effective alternative to judicial
resolution. To be truly an alternative, all available remedies should be available
in securities arbitration, including punitive damages.
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